Insight in specific phobias: a forgotten bias by Carlos Magalhães Coelho et al.
SUMMARY
The term insight is a major concept in psychiatry, which no -
netheless has a number of different connotations ranging
from awareness of one’s disorder to achieving a clear and
sudden solution of a problem or anosognosia. Although this
concept is ubiquitous in the psychological literature, its defi-
nition is not clear, including in DSM-5; the most commonly
used diagnostic system for mental disorders. This turns its
use ambiguous, particularly for those who are not familiar
with the historical background of the word. Here, we aim to
a better understanding of insight in specific phobias and dis-
cuss the possible causes and implications in DSM-5 criterion
changes. The historical analysis of this concept lead to con-
clude three main assumptions: 1) There are probably differ-
ent etiopathogenic mechanisms subjacent to the deve lop ment
of insight, anosognosia and possibly other “insight” related
terms; 2) in the case of specific phobias, lack of insight is bet-
ter seen and explained as a cognitive bias; 3) DSM use of
an insight specifier for specific phobias could be of use; 4)
lack of insight can be seen simply as a cognitive bias in most
phobia cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, the evaluation of insight in specific phobias changed from more
strict views in the DSM III (1980) claiming that a clear insight should be present,
to later intermediate requirements (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005) arguing
that the person could know the disproportionate and excessiveness of their fear
when they are distant or detached from it. In the most recent and quite opposite
view, this requirement is no longer necessary.
Regarding other disorders, namely obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD),
body dysmorphic (BDD), and hoarding disorders, the DSM-5 has specifiers: 
(1) good insight; 
(2) poor insight;
(3) absent insight or delusional beliefs.
The main claim in this manuscript is that the lack of insight in specific phobias
is an interpretive or appraisal type of bias. This bias can be acknowledged in the
diagnostic as a specifier such as those previously described (good, poor, or ab-
sent insight). Considering insight in SP as a bias has significant advantages, as
will be explained herein.
We first discuss the many uses of the term insight and its synonyms. We then out -
line the evolution of insight as a construct when applied to SP in the DSM. We con-
clude by discussing insight as a cognitive bias in SP and the implications of this view.
The many uses of insight and the use of many terms meaning insight
In the present edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the disorders associated with
limited insight include: delusional disorder, brief psychotic disorder, schizophre-
nia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorders, social anxiety disorder, obses-
sive-compulsive disorder, hoarding disorder, body dysmorphic disorder, anorexia
nervosa, substance-related disorders, neurocognitive disorders, and Hunting-
ton’s disease. In personality changes due to another medical condition or stroke-
related symptoms, insight is replaced by anosognosia, but with virtually the same
meaning. For example: “Some individuals with psychosis may lack insight or
awareness of their disorder (i.e., anosognosia) (p. 101)” following Babinski’s (Ba -
binski, 1914) use of the term.
As demonstrated above, the term insight is used in many disorders, but also in-
terchangeably with awareness, denial, anosognosia, or self-consciousness (Da -
vid, 1990; Markova & Berrios, 1995), and may have many different meanings (Red dy,
2016). In the dictionary definition, insight is used as knowledge and referred to as
a deep understanding (of a person or thing). When describing the grandiose type
of delusional disorder, the DSM-5 gives as an example of a delusion theme the
conviction of having some great (unrecognized) talent or insight, using the dictio-
nary form. In addition, when insight is absent, it is termed delusional. 
Among Gestalt psychologists, insight is seen as a sudden breakthrough of
how to solve a problem (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005). In
468
Coelho et al. Specific Phobias
psy choanalytic perspectives, insight is seen as a conscious awareness of wish -
es, defenses, and compromises that interact to produce emotional conflict or
deficits in psychological development (Kivlighan Jr, Multon, & Patton, 2000). Re-
garding psychosis, insight is the patients’ recognition that they are suffering from
a mental illness and their ability to re-attribute or re-label the experience of certain
mental events as being pathological (David, 1990). 
The lack of a precise definition creates difficulties in knowing insight’s nature
and role in different disorders (Marková & Berrios, 2011). At present, the DSM
carries a tremendous volume of information, but its clinical validity is becoming
more often challenged (Mullins-Sweatt, Lengel, & DeShong, 2016), partly due
to conceptual overlapping and historical accretion and partly due to redefining
syndromes without redefining signs and symptoms (Maj, 2016).
In fact, the use of different terminology can be required if there are different
etiopathogenic causal mechanisms related to symptom awareness in various
disorders. For example, anosognosia in hemiplegia is commonly associated with
right hemisphere dysfunction (Heilman, 2014) and might be related to impaired
sensory feedback (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Thus, defining anosog-
nosia, absent insight, and delusional beliefs as synonymous can be an invitation
to misunderstandings. Adding the use of common everyday meanings of insight,
such as factual insight and true insight (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)
intermixed with different constructs sharing the same name and different names
to describe the same construct, increases ambiguity, which will tend to become
more convoluted as the volume of clinical and research data accumulates.
For the above reasons, the conceptual construction of insight seems without
clinically unambiguous soundness. While for clinicians who use the DSM rou-
tinely for years it might seem quite evident, to the researcher or neuroscientist
with no clinical experience, the said polysemic use of insight in the DSM and the
use of interchangeable terms can be overwhelming. We next concisely explore
the clinical and historical origins of the term insight in SP.
DSM changes in insight regarding specific phobia 
Insight was an SP diagnostic criterion from 1980 (American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 1980) until its removal in 2013. Since the publication of the DSM-II in
1968 (American Psychiatric Association, 1968), insight had been seen as one
of the main differential characteristics of neuroses. In fact, insight was the primary
differential criterion between neuroses and psychoses, mainly because the for-
mer patients are not as detached from reality (Maser, Kaelber, & Weise, 1991).
The subsequent DSM formats kept the dichotomous distinction neuroses/psy-
choses by requiring adults to recognize their fear as excessive or irrational. Neu-
rosis was seen as a condition in which the awareness of a patient’s own
disrupted or degraded mental functioning was present, and this recognition was
called insight. This concept was originally defined as an all-or-nothing unitary
phenomenon. Individuals were considered categorically to own it or lack it, but
this would change over time. 
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Different names were given since the first edition of the DSM to what we call
today specific phobia, namely phobic reaction in 1952 by the time of the first
DSM edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1952), phobic neurosis in the
DSM-II (American Psychiatric Association, 1968), simple phobia in the DSM-III
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) and DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987), and finally specific phobia both in the DSM-IV (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2000). The diagnosis of SP was characterized by an intense fear of an ob-
ject or situation in which the individual had conscious awareness of it as not
posing a real danger. In the DSM-III this was expressed in criterion B: “… recog-
nition by the individual that his or her fear is excessive or unreasonable” (p. 230).
Similarly, the 1987 DSM revised edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1987)
required acknowledgment of the danger disproportionality. The absence of in-
sight was seen as an important sign that other disorders should be considered,
namely those of a psychotic nature. 
Presently, insight is still often used as a descriptive feature specifier conveying
supplementary information that can help design better treatment planning.
Hence, the removal of insight criterion in SP in the DSM-5 does not reflect overall
changes related to a diminished importance of insight since this concept was re-
fined relatively in 3 other disorders. So, what where those reasons?
Removing insight from SP
One strong motivation for the DSM removal of Criterion C (the person is able
to assume that his or her fear is excessive or unreasonable) in SP was Zimmer-
man and colleagues’ work (Zimmerman, Dalrymple, Chelminski, Young, & Galio -
ne, 2010). The authors found that some patients with phobia were not diagnosed
as phobic because they did not recognize the excessiveness or unreasonable-
ness of their fear. As such, the Criterion C was creating a false-negative problem.
Using a modified version of the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV, the
authors interviewed 3,000 psychiatric outpatients and 1,800 candidates for
bariatric surgery. Their analysis revealed that among the outpatients with SP,
4.1% (lifetime) and 4.2% (current diagnosis) did not meet Criterion C. This was
considered a low percentage to justify keeping the criterion, in addition to creating
the above-mentioned false-negative problem, since some patients that should
be diagnosed with SP were excluded for not having met Criterion C.
Although these findings and arguments for the removal of insight as a criterion
for SP seem sound, the non-inclusion of insight specifiers is surprising. Several
arguments would favor removing Criterion C while still adding an insight specifier.
First, it should be noted that OCD, one of the disorders that has the insight spec-
ifier, also presents 4% or fewer individuals with absent insight or delusional be-
liefs (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Second, the removal of the insight
criterion without the substitution of a similar specifier now used to classify OCD,
BDD, or HD does not acknowledge variability and within-category heterogeneity,
potentially dropping inter-rater reliability ratings or favoring other diagnostics.
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Third, previous studies of phobic disorders have questioned the insight of pa-
tients with SP (Jones & Menzies, 2000; Menzies & Clarke, 1995; Menzies, Harris,
& Jones, 1998) and favored the inclusion of specifiers in SP.
In favor of our argument, a spider fear study from Jones and Menzies (Jones
& Menzies, 2000) found that even when removed from the proximity of the phobic
stimulus, phobic subjects still gave higher estimates of the probability of injury
resulting in harm and claimed more reasonability of their anxiety when compared
to controls. Menzies and Clarke (1995) also compared danger perception of par-
ticipants with acrophobia (n = 59) and a control group (n = 59). Evaluations were
performed both before and during the exposure to a fire ladder attached to 
a parking lot. Before being examined, the participants with acrophobia estimated
falling as more likely and the possible consequences of falling as being more
damaging compared to the control group. They also believed that their levels of
anticipatory anxiety were more reasonable and appropriate to the demands of
the situation. Thus, their judgments and beliefs were excessive and unreason-
able, defying the idea that participants with specific phobias have a clear insight
regarding the inadequacy of their anxiety. 
When these studies were performed, the DSM-IV (1994) had a subcategory
of poor insight for obsessive-compulsive disorder in Axis V (Global Assessment
of Functioning). Since the participants still scored very high regarding danger
expectancies, even when removed from the fearful situation, this prompted Men-
zies and colleagues (1998) to propose a similar category of poor insight in spe-
cific phobias. In their study, 64 acrophobic participants were placed at the base
of external stairs in a parking lot. From this situation, they were asked to predict
the probability of falling if they went up the stairs. The results showed that the
two groups could be separated based on a self-reported likelihood of falling su-
perior or inferior to 50%: a good insight group (n = 31) and a poor insight group
(n = 33). The good insight group rated the probability of falling at 9.84% com-
pared to 88.6% in the poor insight group. As the groups were not different in age,
gender, or average anxiety, the authors suggested that insight itself was the con-
struct that best differentiated the groups. 
As we have seen, the work of Menzies and colleagues suggests that insight
may be poor even when the individual is distant from phobic cues. These reasons
indicate that although Criterion C removal in SP might is justified, there are sound
studies and arguments that indicate the importance of an insight specifier in SP.
Insight as a cognitive bias in phobias
Insight as self-knowledge into an individual’s mental disorder can be a mis-
leading definition when discerning phobias. Insight in SP is not about fear aware-
ness, but rather about an excessive attribution of danger to a particular stimulus.
The lack of insight regarding danger is an incorrect judgment and is based on
the subjective appraisal of an external phenomenon (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer,
& Frijda, 2013). Fear is an automatic system, involuntary and hard to access
through introspection (Öhman & Mineka, 2001), whereas insight is the evaluation
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of proportionality regarding the relationship between the stimuli and the dangers
it might pose. This evaluation can suffer from an interpretive bias (MacLeod &
Mathews, 2012), which is known to exist in people with SP, and psychological
explanations regarding fear posit attention and judgment biases as a cause of
danger overestimation (Arntz, Rauner, & Van den Hout, 1995).
Beck and colleagues (Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, & Warman, 2004) termed
cognitive insight as comprising “distorted beliefs and misinterpretations (p. 321)”.
A specific phobia is by standard definition a fear that is out of proportion to the
danger, and the patient can be more or less aware of this (fear/danger) discrep-
ancy. Therefore, insight in SP is the awareness of the gap lying between the per-
ceived and the real danger. The insight regarding this disproportionality is a cognitive
evaluation. As such, lack of insight is a cognitive bias.
Individuals with anxiety disorders more easily interpret information as indica-
tive of a potential threat, creating a vicious cycle in which ambiguous situations
are more often experienced as threatening (Beard, 2011; Hertel & Mathews,
2011), so hypothetically changing this bias could change the feeling and behav-
ior. However, in arachnophobia, for example, biases are common (Reese, McNally,
Najmi, & Amir, 2010), but cognitive bias modification (CBM) does not reduce spider
fear (de Jong & Muris, 2002). This result can be due to the fact that this procedure
changes insight but not fear itself. 
To summarize, in SP, poor insight can be of an interpretive nature and result
from an appraisal bias. People with fear will tend to perceive exaggerated danger
in case of ambiguity (for example, a dog may or may not be there, but I will go
around anyway, just in case) or when information is not ambiguous (for example,
the dog is small and friendly, but I stay far anyway because I feel bad). As Arntz
and colleagues pointed out, participants with SP infer risk on the basis of their
anxiety response (Arntz et al., 1995). An expectancy bias can exist regarding
the possibility of imminent danger. However, the physical fear response to a pho-
bic stimulus is more or less independent from the following cognitive meaning
attributed by the participant (Coelho & Purkis, 2009). That is, in SP, insight and
bias seem to be independent from fear.
When the bias about the danger of the object or situation is extreme, it may
impede phobic individuals from recognizing the irrationality of their beliefs re-
garding the threat of the stimuli, being in complete conviction of their beliefs. This
justifies the use of the term delusion to indicate extreme lack of insight.
An insight specifier in specific phobias would stress the importance regarding
the individual evaluation of the real danger of the feared object or situation. This
is essential to treatment choices, as different levels of insight require different
treatment approaches (Nemeroff et al., 2013). For example, using virtual reality
(VR) technology, patients can become thoroughly immersed in a task. In a realistic
VR environment, phobic individuals with a poor insight might be able to desensitize
better in a first treatment approach, since there is no real danger (Coelho, Santos,
Silvério, & Silva, 2006). Conversely, phobic participants with good insight might
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be susceptible to less bias and hence more prone to other types of treatment,
such as direct exposure therapy.
Conceptualizing insight in this perspective allows for a better evaluation and mea-
surement of the bias (insight) in specific phobias and should lead to a better under-
standing and treatment of this condition, along with an improved interplay between
the clinical and experimental studies of SP. It is important to remember that the clin-
ician makes insight assessment. So, if clinicians can use experimental tools to mea-
sure insight, their biases in their clinical judgements will also be reduced. 
DISCUSSION
Knowing the history of DSM changes regarding insight and its many meanings
is useful for academics, clinicians, and researchers who focus on fear and pho-
bias across various fields (for example, genetics, systems neuroscience, or be-
havioral science). Nonetheless, excessive historical burden given to classifying
terms may contribute to a diagnostic classification resulting in historical accretion
with little relevance to current scientific needs (Frances & Widiger, 2012). In some
cases, this method of preserving the history of clinical classification systems
seems to be accumulating noise and hampering simplicity. Adding an insight de-
scriptive specifier and defining the concept of insight can mitigate this cumulative
conceptual historical burden.
Clarifying and agreeing on a practical terminology will improve both research
and clinical practice. For insight to be defined using genetic, imaging, and neu-
rochemical information (Helzer, Kraemer, & Krueger, 2006), it needs to be anchored
in an experimentally measurable way. Identifying insight as a measurable con-
struct (bias) that has been studied in anxiety disorders for decades strongly ap-
proaches experimental and clinical psychopathology, creating bridges between
these two fields that nomenclature now hinders. 
Insight is also an important factor for predicting treatment. Although specific
phobias can cause significant interference or distress and potentially impair oc-
cupational and interpersonal functioning, only a minority of affected persons seek
professional help (Coles, Schubert, Heimberg, & Weiss, 2014). This can be due to
lack of insight, as people with low insight might not even consider treatment for their
fear to seem reasonable. This is even more important since SP are one a common
anxiety disorder with reported 12-month rates of 8.7% (Kessler et al., 2005).
The use of an insight specifier for specific phobias (for example, good, poor,
or absent insight) seems appropriate in specific phobias, since a body of evi-
dence shows that there are several levels of insight in this clinical condition.
Defining insight as a bias also allows the clinician to better appraise patients’
ability to evaluate the real danger of the stimulus, planning treatments more ac-
curately, and predicting treatment adherence and compliance. 
Regarding research, interpreting insight as a bias is useful not only to research
itself, but also to facilitate communication with clinicians. For example, different sub-
types of specific phobias might be more or less “vulnerable” to insight. It is also
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likely that appraisal and interpretive bias bears developmental origins leading to
specific phobias. These include fear conditioning-based as well as vicarious and
information learning as pathways leading to the development of specific phobias.
Information learned fears might be more vulnerable to cognitive bias modifica-
tion-1 (CBM-I) compared to traumatic fears. By the same token, prepared fears
(that is, those associated with evolutionary fear-relevant stimuli) should be less
susceptible to CBM-I. Therefore, many research opportunities can derive from
observing insight as a bias, and insight can also be better understood as a bias
with similar advantages in other disorders. 
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